



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

gradually to strengthen the relationship of the children to the mother, and eventually to both parents, and thus gives rise to the permanent organization of the family.''

It does not seem likely that the circulation of *The Friend's Annual* was wide or that a copy was ever seen by Fiske. I have been unable to find another copy than the one in Mr. Robinson's possession. The obvious similarity of thought and expression simply shows how hard it is to be wholly original in the sense of thinking and saying what no one ever thought or said before.

WESLEY RAYMOND WELLS.

LAKE FOREST COLLEGE.

THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION—EASTERN DIVISION

THERE are two kinds of people who attend philosophical meetings: those who go because of the papers to be presented; and those who go in spite of them. Probably by temperament, training or moral convictions most American philosophers belong consistently to one or the other of the two classes. Probably most of them, that is, are impervious alike to disillusionment and to agreeable surprise, and so continue either to regard the programme prepared by the executive committee as the Mecca of the annual pilgrimage; or to deplore it is a necessary evil—something by no means warranting the expenditure of railroad fare. But undoubtedly there is always also a small minority capable of the human grace of change of heart. A few pessimists turn optimistic; a few optimists arrive at the delayed and gloomy conclusion that philosophy in America has gone to the dogs.

If many were moved to unwonted enthusiasm over this year's oblation to the spirit of Philosophy, confirmed cynics will probably insinuate that the fact may be explained as due to the unprecedented brevity of the ceremony. After all, nobody minds even extreme twinges of boredom or of pain provided they be brief enough; and to be served with but three formal sessions, duly punctuated by unusually delightful social gatherings, might create the illusion of enjoyment merely by contrast with the prolonged boredom to which one was accustomed. Any defender of the Poughkeepsie sessions would have to admit that they were brief. But he would still maintain that they were also intrinsically interesting and important. Presumably the chief task of the present

reviewer is to indicate what there was about the twenty-first congregation of philosophers to call for special praise.

There were ten papers promised, nine given, and the first ground for favorable comment on so limited a programme was the variety of the interests represented. The list of topics dealt with in the papers themselves included: the nature of religion, the nature of the good, the nature of a physical thing, the nature of philosophy. Subjects as wide asunder as Kemp Smith's commentary on Kant and the superstitions of popular philosophy were criticized; while by one writer the concept of civilization, by another, the concept of experience was displayed for analysis. In the course of the discussion attendant upon the formal presentations, the points of view of absolute idealism, of extreme pragmatism, of moderated pragmatism, of positivism, of agnosticism, and of several degrees of realism were picturesquely exemplified. The papers would have possessed some value if they had done no more than thus demonstrate the actual range of current philosophical opinion.

What might have been supposed to rank among the less significant of the contributions proved one of the most brilliant—Professor Meiklejohn's remarks on Smith's *Commentary*. If commentaries themselves savor of the parasitic—subsisting, vulture-like upon the carcasses of other men's ideas—a commentary upon a commentary should be but the parasite of a parasite. But, at least in the case of Professor Meiklejohn's acute and epigrammatic criticism, the double negative took on the character of a genuine positive. The paper was important not as an elicitor of wide and varied discussion—it was replied to merely by Professor Cohen—but as a little gem of analysis and exposition. Esthetically, it had the effect of a philosophical lyric, if one will grant the substitution of logical for poetical poignancy, and dialectical cohesion for a merely emotional unity. By deft manipulation of Kemp Smith's premises, Professor Meiklejohn demonstrated that Smith's attempted annihilation of Kant came to naught, reducing to the protest that Kant didn't mean what he said he meant. He denounced in particular as highly questionable Smith's method of arbitrarily selecting out of a paragraph one set of Kantian propositions, forcibly taken out of context, and rejecting as improper intrusions of a different date another set actually interwoven with the first.

Another paper which fell into the midst of relative silence was that of Professor Cohen on *Myth and Science in Popular Philosophy*. One part of the audience agreed so profoundly with Professor Cohen's contentions that they found nothing to say in the way

of criticism or qualification. Another part experienced such thorough disapproval of the spirit and ultimate implications of what he expressed that nothing short of a pitched battle would have promised satisfaction. It was not a mere sense of the present incompleteness and unwarranted dogmatism of science that Professor Cohen gave voice to. The spirit of his polemic was cynical—as if he felt actual glee in the weaknesses and deficiencies he discovered—and the intention of it seemed to be to throw in question as all equally childish and superstitious the best-grounded hypotheses of modern thought. It was as they concerned the concept of evolution that his comments were perhaps especially to be deplored.

They were to be deplored chiefly for the improper use to which they might be put, all the more dangerous by reason of his own great learning and ingenuity. He was directing his attacks against *all* undue certitude, *all* forms of superstition, and it is certainly not to be supposed that he intended for a moment to lend support to anything like the Mosaic account of creation as an alternative to the Darwinian. And yet there can be no doubt that the popular effect of any somewhat ambiguous criticism of the doctrine of natural selection is always the lamentable one of reinforcing doubt of science from the standpoint of religion. With fanatics in the state of Kentucky bent on controlling biological instruction out of consideration for church dogmas, and with certain otherwise admirable New York papers giving voice to the bigotry of those for whom the theory of organic evolution is an *a priori* impossibility, scientific doubts need to be couched carefully if they would not mislead. As an example of wise caution, the procedure of Professor Bateson in his address on *Evolutionary Faith and Modern Doubts* before the American Association for the Advancement of Science at its December Meeting in Toronto may be cited. He said at the close of his paper: "I have put before you frankly the considerations which have made us agnostic as to the actual mode and processes of evolution. When such confessions are made the enemies of science see their chance. . . . Let us then proclaim in precise and unmistakable language that our faith in evolution is unshaken. Every available line of argument converges on this inevitable conclusion. The obscurantist has nothing to suggest which is worth a moment's attention." Any one in the ranks of science or philosophy failing to make such specific confession of positive faith should take heed lest he be unwittingly counted among the obscurantists rather than as merely an exponent of an esoteric type of skepticism.

The only other paper of the afternoon session with Professor Cohen was that of Professor Montague entitled *The Missing Link in the Case for Utilitarianism*. As always when problems of ethics are introduced, the discussion that followed was fast and furious. The theory put forward was that, whereas Mill rightly felt that there are different kinds of happiness, some being incommensurably superior to others, he need not have abandoned the utilitarian principle that happiness is the sole measure of good, if he had recognized dimensionalities of happiness. This concept of dimensionality, so Professor Montague contended, while doing full justice to the fact that no number of pig contentments could equal a Socratic contentment, still makes possible the avoidance of any other quality than happiness in the hierarchy of goods. The difference, then, between a simple pleasure and virtue would still remain quantitative, one being a good, the other a permanent ground for unlimited further goods. The discussion was participated in by Professors Cohen, Brown, Bakewell, Pratt, Fullerton, and others. Some acute criticisms were offered by Professor Fullerton in particular, and Professors Cohen and Pratt suggested analogies for the elucidation of Professor Montague's theory. It can not, however, be said that the case for utilitarianism was finally settled, one way or the other.

In two other papers at the close of the sessions on the following day the problem of the good was reopened, first by Dr. Stephen Pepper under the title: *Primitive and Standard Value*, and then by Dr. C. E. Ayres in exposition of the theme: *Before Good and Evil: Civilization*. Again there was animated argument, particularly with regard to the point of view apparently shared by the two speakers, that standards of good and evil are quite empirical affairs, the product of group habit and ultimately the outcome of instinctive behavior. Mr. Ayres, in particular, appeared to think that a kind of majority vote was the final criterion of the good. Professors Pratt, Montague and others attacked the notion that standards are devoid of objective validity, as Mr. Pepper had contended, and Professor Overstreet, in a brief but very eloquent speech, set forth what is probably the most defensible view in the whole matter: that the good is not an absolute in the sense in which possibly mathematical truth is, but is relative to consciousness, without, however, being entirely individual and variable. The good, that is, is to be defined by reference to the ideal maximum development of human valuation.

There remain to be considered the first four papers on the programme: that by Professor French on *The Metaphysical Value of*

the Religious Consciousness; that by Professor W. K. Wright on *Situations and Experience*; that by Professor Sellars, entitled *Does a Physical Thing Possess Attributes?* and finally Professor Creighton's paper on the *Form of Philosophical Intelligibility*. This last took us back to the chief topic of the previous annual conference which was mainly concerned with the problem of the nature and function of philosophy. Professor Creighton defended the idealistic standpoint that things can be truly known only in relation to the whole, and that the significant inquiry is as to values rather than existences. He noted the two important points of difference between science and philosophy resulting from these two doctrines, and insisted that it is only by the coöperation of imagination with reason that philosophic knowledge—knowledge of the concrete universal—is made possible.

It was in connection with the discussion of Professor French's paper, however, that the implications of absolute idealism were brought out with most startling clearness by Professor Creighton. Professor French had stated that the essential core of the religious consciousness was the faith that the ideal is real. This had elicited from Professor Montague a violent protest against the confusion of religion and ethics, and an affirmation of the essentially unethical consequence of any religious doctrine to the effect that "all's right with the world." To which Professor Creighton responded that the ethicist was being confused with the reformer—an individual to be tabooed by the truly ethical and religious. Essentially unethical in his opinion is not the regarding of the world as perfect, but rather the regarding of it as anything else—and the consequent striving to make it other than we find it.

This position is of course the traditional one for believers in the absolute, and there was nothing really novel in the defense of it nor yet in the defense of its opposite. What was picturesque and really valuable was the clear-cut presentation of the irreconcilable viewpoints as summed up in the protest and counter-protest from the floor. We are so pervasively occupied in elaborating the minor aspects of our respective philosophies, that it is wholesome and refreshing now and then to see their crucial dogmas baldly exhibited. There was no resolution of the two viewpoints—as there can not be; but at least no ambiguity was left as to the utter opposition between them.

Professor Wright dragged into the arena for reconsideration the pragmatist coupling of situations and experience. Though at first hotly defending an orthodox pragmatic view he finally, under the goad of questioning, expressed a tentatively agnostic attitude

which would be quite unobjectionable to many outside the pragmatic persuasion. A genuinely objective world of values, truths and relations was practically admitted by him as logically implied by the very doctrine of pragmatism itself.

To his own query as to whether physical things possess attributes, Professor Sellars, disclaiming the possible imputation that he spoke for all critical realists, replied in the negative. A lively debate between him and speakers from the floor followed his presentation of the view that what might be called structure—identical, apparently, with space-time predicates—constitutes a so-called physical thing as it is in itself. Professor Fullerton pressed his question as to why any one should be more sure of the objective reality of primary qualities than of secondary; and others variously defended, on the one hand, a more radically realistic view than that promoted by Professor Sellars, and on the other, a more agnostic or subjective. The consensus of opinion seemed to be that mere “structural” entities such as Professor Sellars defended as the stuff of the objective universe, were as highly questionable things as Berkeley had found “substance” to be.

Of the brilliant presidential address by Professor Sheldon entitled *Soul and Matter* there was, of course, no discussion. If there had been opportunity, rather lively debate might have been anticipated. For Professor Sheldon, after a telling enumeration of the kind of considerations which lead to dissatisfaction with traditional materialism, proceeded to defend a doctrine of souls, but souls interpreted after an unusual manner. It was a creed of soul-substance that we were offered; not, however, a soul-substance divisible and capable of taking on varying configurations. The soul, according to Professor Sheldon, must be regarded as possessing at once all the attributes it would possess as a material thing and as a psychical—in other words, it is a psychic substance, a kind of monad, an ultimate, indivisible, spiritual unit which is yet a genuine substance and in no wise a mere form or force.

The annual dinner which preceded the President’s address took place in Main Hall of Vassar College where all meals were served to members of the Association, and where likewise the reception given by President and Mrs. McCracken was held on the first evening. Very much was gained in the way of comfort and informality by having the association housed in one building, with only a few steps to take to Rockefeller Hall where the formal meetings took place. There was consequently ample opportunity for that intimate interchange of ideas which to many affords more pleasure and profit than does any amount of public discussion. Probably

few if any permanent conversions from one philosophic allegiance to another ever occur in this way, but at least sometimes there takes place an enlargement of vision in which the splendid range and variety of possible viewpoints becomes manifest. Effort after sympathetic envisagement of theories opposed to one's own then ceases to be distasteful, since truth is seen to be something far less simple and easy than an affirmation of one creed or its bare contradiction. Perhaps this recognition of a reality so rich that it generates a multiplicity of doctrines is more than anything else the goal of philosophic convocation.

HELEN HUSS PARKHURST.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Principles of Sociology. EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. New York: The Century Company. 1920. Pp. xviii + 708.

In a letter published by Professor Ross as a foreword to his *Sin and Society* in 1907, Theodore Roosevelt said: "It is to Justice Holmes that I owed the pleasure and profit of reading your book on Social Control. The Justice spoke of it to me as one of the strongest and most striking presentations of the subject he had ever seen." A writer to whom Justice Holmes and Theodore Roosevelt, not to mention a host of others, acknowledge their debt may justly lay claim to being a power in the intellectual life of America. By all that large public, therefore, who have known Professor Ross through his *Social Control*, *Social Psychology*, *Sin and Society*, *Changing America*, not to mention his *Changing Chinese* and *South of Panama*, this, his latest and most ambitious work, will be gratefully received.

The *Principles of Sociology* is a bulky volume of over seven hundred pages and is evidently intended to be the author's magnum opus. We are told that he was seventeen years in gathering the material through a first-hand study of conditions in China, Russia, South America and the United States while three and one half years were occupied with the actual writing of the book. The book shows those qualities that made for the success of Professor Ross's earlier works, namely, marvellous *Belesenheit*, a wealth of interesting illustrative material amassed by a keen and far-traveled observer, a zeal for facts combined with a phobia for the philosophical and a style which in journalistic vividness hardly attains the level of earlier works such as *Sin and Society*.